Agency Free Will and Moral Responsabillity Rosario University

Programme Structure

Content

• The problem of human agency

• Compatibilism
• Incompatibilism
• Libertarianism
• Semi-compatibilism
• Hard Determinism
• Hard Incompatibilism.
• Source Incompatibilism
• Leeway Incompatibilism
• The Basic Argument for Incompatibilism
• Quantum Mechanics and Brain Function

• Original Frankfurt Counterexamples.
• The Dilemma Defense
• Blockage Cases
• Determinist Frankfurt-Cases
• A new Objection (still alive)

• Control
• Epistemic condition for moral responsibility
• Tracing
• Luck

• Three types of moral obligation (Objective, Subjective, Prospective)
• The 'Ought Implies Can Maxim'

Lecturers

Carlos G Patarroyo

Colombia

The holder of a PhD in Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy and Liberal Arts for over 14 years, he has taught at the National University of Colombia, the El Bosque University as well as at the Rosario University. He was awarded the prize for the excellence of his teaching at the Rosario University in 2006, and was appointed Distinguished Professor in 2013. He has organized the three versions of the International Symposium on “Agency, Responsibility and Character”, he is editor of the monographic issue of the academic journal Ideas y Valores entitled “Libertad, Determinismo y Responsabilidad Moral” (Vol. LVII, No. 141 - 2009). His doctoral thesis was on moral responsibility and agency and was awarded. He has written many publications in the matter, most recently “Ought without Ability” (in Buckareff; Moya; Rosell (eds.). Agency, Freedom and Moral Responsibility. Palgrave MacMillan. 2015. Pp. 165-178).